The implications of debt heterogeneity for R&D investment and firm performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: David, Parthiban; O'Brien, Jonathan P.; Yoshikawa, Toru
• 署名单位: University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman; University College Dublin; McMaster University
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 165-181
• 关键词: capital structure; institutional investors; governance; cost; AGENCY; US; methodology; specificity; integration; INNOVATION

摘要

An assumption in prior research is that debt is homogeneous and provides inappropriate governance for R&D investments. We argue that debt is heterogeneous: although transactional debt does indeed impose strict contractual constraints that provide inappropriate governance for R&D investments, relational debt has very different characteristics that provide more appropriate governance. Using a sample of Japanese firms, we find that firms that align their debt structures with their R&D investments perform better than those that are misaligned. Furthermore, firms tend to align their debt structure with R&D investments, but only after deregulation permits relatively free access to various types of debt.