A MATTER OF APPEARANCES: HOW CORPORATE LEADERS MANAGE THE IMPRESSIONS OF FINANCIAL ANALYSTS ABOUT THE CONDUCT OF THEIR BOARDS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Westphal, James D.; Graebner, Melissa E.
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2010.48036721
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 15-44
• 关键词: ORGANIZATIONAL LEGITIMACY; institutional investors; SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION; SYMBOLIC MANAGEMENT; Ownership structure; ceo compensation; Agency theory; performance; firm; governance

摘要

Our theory and findings suggest that relatively negative stock analyst appraisals prompt corporate leaders to increase externally visible dimensions of board independence without actually increasing board control of management. We also consider how relatively negative analyst appraisals may prompt impression management in CEO communications with analysts, whereby CEOs attest to their boards' tendency to monitor and control management on behalf of shareholders. We also find that increases in formal board independence, in combination with verbal impression management directed toward analysts, result in more favorable subsequent analyst appraisals of firms, despite a lack of effect on actual board control.