PERCEPTIONS OF BENEVOLENCE AND THE DESIGN OF AGENCY CONTRACTS: CEO-TMT RELATIONSHIPS IN FAMILY FIRMS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cruz, Cristina C.; Gomez-Mejia, Luis R.; Becerra, Manuel
• 署名单位: IE University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2010.48036975
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 69-89
• 关键词: VARIABLE RISK PREFERENCES; TOP EXECUTIVE COMMITMENT; corporate-ownership; trust; management; COMPENSATION; performance; MODEL; pay; DIRECTORS

摘要

In this study, we view the contracts of top managers from an integrated agency theory-trust perspective, arguing that two conditions reflecting CEO risk bearing, top management team (TMT) behavioral uncertainty and CEO vulnerability, are negatively related to a CEO's perceptions of TMT benevolence toward him-/herself, which in turn influence the protective features of TMT contracts. Model tests on data from 122 family-owned firms in Spain support our hypotheses overall. Agency theory may be enhanced by accounting for a CEO's perceptions (as principal) of TMT benevolence and for the effect of those perceptions on contracts with TMT members (as agents).