FAIRNESS MONITORING: LINKING MANAGERIAL CONTROLS AND FAIRNESS JUDGMENTS IN ORGANIZATIONS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Long, Chris P.; Bendersky, Corinne; Morrill, Calvin
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2011.0008
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1045-1068
• 关键词: justice; satisfaction; perceptions; MARKETS

摘要

We argue that different types of perceived managerial controls that convey performance standards to subordinates increase the perceived relevance of particular aspects of fairness in organizations. We introduce the concept of fairness monitoring to characterize subordinates' efforts to gather and process fairness information to make sense of their organizations. In scenario and survey studies, we found that subordinates who perceive market controls engage in distributive fairness monitoring, subordinates who perceive bureaucratic controls engage in procedural fairness monitoring, and subordinates who perceive clan controls engage in interpersonal fairness monitoring. We also found that asserting clear controls and promoting the type of fairness that subordinates monitor most closely produces a positive three-way interaction affecting job satisfaction.