ME OR WE: THE EFFECTS OF CEO ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTIFICATION ON AGENCY COSTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boivie, Steven; Lange, Donald; McDonald, Michael L.; Westphal, James D.
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2011.61968081
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 551-576
• 关键词: TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS; corporate governance; executive-compensation; managerial incentives; Ownership structure; BOARD COMPOSITION; firm performance; social identity; ADVICE NETWORKS; strategy

摘要

The corporate governance literature on potential remedies for the agency problem has focused largely on external control mechanisms, especially board independence. We instead consider how an internal, psychological factor-CEO organizational identification-may influence the extent to which firms incur agency costs, including those entailed by the decoupling of CEO pay and perquisites from firm performance. Our theory and findings explain why a CEO with high organizational identification may avoid pursuit of personal gains that can harm the firm he or she leads and its image. We further show how board independence is less likely to reduce agency costs when CEO organizational identification is high.