MANAGERS AND ANALYSTS: AN EXAMINATION OF MUTUAL INFLUENCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Washburn, Mark; Bromiley, Philip
• 署名单位: California State University System; California State University Long Beach; University of California System; University of California Irvine
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2011.0420
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 849-868
• 关键词: institutional investors; CERTIFICATION CONTESTS; EMPIRICAL-EXAMINATION; earnings management; SECURITIES ANALYSTS; SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION; career concerns; prospect-theory; corporate; ORGANIZATIONS

摘要

Securities analysts' predictions of firms' earnings per share constitute important performance targets for those firms. Firm managers attempt to both influence analysts' targets and achieve the targets. We draw on the impression management literature to offer hypotheses regarding how a firm's performance relative to prior targets influences the impression management activities of issuing forecast guidance, having conference calls with analysts, and issuing press releases. We also consider the influence of these impression management activities on subsequent analysts' targets. We test this dyadic representation of impression management activities using a longitudinal panel of large firms. Findings suggest managers take a variety of actions that vary with firm performance, and that some of those actions influence subsequent analyst targets under some conditions.