SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLEMENTS? A CONFIGURATIONAL EXAMINATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Misangyi, Vilmos F.; Acharya, Abhijith G.
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Singapore Management University
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2012.0728
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1681-1705
• 关键词: ceo pay; institutional investors; managerial incentives; financial performance; Ownership structure; BOARD COMPOSITION; COMPENSATION; management; firm; DIRECTORS

摘要

We conduct an exploratory qualitative comparative case analysis of the S&P 1500 firms with the aim of elaborating theory on how corporate governance mechanisms work together effectively. To do so, we integrate extant theory and research to specify the bundle of mechanisms that operate to mitigate the agency problem among publicly traded corporations and review what previous research has said about how these mechanisms combine. We then use the fuzzy-set approach to qualitative comparitive analysis (QCA) to explore the combinations of governance mechanisms that exist among the S&P 1500 firms that achieve high (and not-high) profitability. Our findings suggest that high profits result when CEO incentive alignment and monitoring mechanisms work together as complements rather than as substitutes. Furthermore, they show that high profits are obtained when both internal and external monitoring mechanisms are present. At the same time, however, monitoring mechanisms evidently combine in complex ways such that there may be simultaneity of substitution and complementarily among and across the various monitoring and control mechanisms. Our findings clearly suggest that the effectiveness of board independence and CEO non-duality governance mechanisms widely believed to singularly resolve the agency problem depends on how each combine with the other mechanisms in the governance bundle.