SAFE BETS OR HOT HANDS? HOW STATUS AND CELEBRITY INFLUENCE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE FORMATIONS BY NEWLY PUBLIC FIRMS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hubbard, Timothy D.; Pollock, Timothy G.; Pfarrer, Michael D.; Rindova, Violina P.
• 署名单位: University of Notre Dame; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; University of Southern California; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2016.0438
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1976-1999
• 关键词: VENTURE CAPITAL FIRMS; SIGNALING THEORY; VALUE-CREATION; INFORMATION; media; performance; MARKET; POWER; CONSEQUENCES; reputation

摘要

Social approval assets derive their value from favorable stakeholder perceptions. Past research has focused primarily on their role as signals that reduce stakeholders' perceived uncertainty about the firm. However, social approval assets can also serve as frames that influence how other information is interpreted. We theorize how the frames associated with two social approval assets-status and celebrity-influence the interpretation of equivocal information about newly public firms. Specifically, we examine how each frame influences the way underpricing is interpreted, and how these interpretations, as well as the joint effects of possessing status and celebrity, influence newly public firms' strategic alliance formations. We explore these ideas in the ambiguity-ridden context of Dot-Com firms during the commercial dawn of the Internet. Our findings generally support our arguments, providing new theory and evidence about the framing effects of social approval assets with different sociocognitive content, and the dynamics of information and frame (in)congruence.