WHO WILL BOARD A SINKING SHIP? A FIRM-DIRECTOR INTERDEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE OF MUTUAL SELECTION BETWEEN DECLINING FIRMS AND DIRECTOR CANDIDATES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jiang, Han; Xia, Jun; Devers, Cynthia E.; Shen, Wei
• 署名单位: Tulane University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2018.0452
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 901-925
• 关键词: CONTEXT-EMERGENT TURNOVER; RESOURCE DEPENDENCE; ORGANIZATIONAL DECLINE; matching estimators; CET THEORY; bankruptcy; performance; network; IMPACT; POWER

摘要

We develop a firm-director interdependence perspective to theorize director appointments as the outcome of a mutual selection process in which firms and director candidates select each other based on their organizational and personal dependencies. We apply this perspective to address a puzzle regarding director appointment in declining firms: Declining firms are often motivated to bring in director candidates with high resource endowments to help enact turnarounds, but these candidates may not join a declining firm's board due to the potential uncertainties and reputational loss of doing so. Drawing on the firm-director interdependence perspective, we predict that director candidates' social capital and human capital have inverted U-shaped effects on their likelihood of joining a declining firm. Moreover, the declining firm's organizational social capital differently moderates the effects of candidates' social capital and human capital. Evidence from a sample of public firms under special treatment (*ST) in China supports our theoretical predictions.