MONITORING AN OWNER - THE CASE OF TURNER BROADCASTING
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
HOLDERNESS, CG; SHEEHAN, DP
署名单位：
University of Chicago; Purdue University System; Purdue University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-405X
DOI：
10.1016/0304-405X(91)90035-I
发表日期：
1991
页码：
325-346
关键词：
摘要：
Turner Broadcasting illustrates how organizational mechanisms can be adapted to prevent a majority owner from imposing costs on minority shareholders through inept management or opportunistic behavior. These mechanisms involve issuing preferred stock with unusual features, concentrating its ownership among a small group of investors, allowing the new preferred shareholders to elect several directors, and requiring supramajority approval of major management decisions by a reconstituted board of directors. The alienability of the preferred stock is restricted to help insure that its ownership stays concentrated and in the hands of those with the specific knowledge and incentives to be effective monitors.