DEREGULATION, CONTESTABILITY, AND AIRLINE ACQUISITIONS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
SLOVIN, MB; SUSHKA, ME; HUDSON, CD
署名单位：
Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Auburn University System; Auburn University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-405X
DOI：
10.1016/0304-405X(91)90031-E
发表日期：
1991
页码：
231-251
关键词：
摘要：
We test whether airline consolidations generate monopoly profits by examining returns to listed carriers around horizontal airline-acquisition bids and evaluating effects of industry concentration on share-price reactions. Under Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulation, returns to targets, bidders, and rival carriers are positive functions of changes in concentration implied by bids. Changes in concentration after deregulation have no positive effect on carrier returns. These results support Jordan's (1970, 1972) hypothesis that CAB activities fostered carrier collusion. There is no evidence of monopoly gains from carrier consolidations after deregulation.