ADVERSE SELECTION AND THE RIGHTS OFFER PARADOX
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
ECKBO, BE; MASULIS, RW
署名单位：
Vanderbilt University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-405X
DOI：
10.1016/0304-405X(92)90030-2
发表日期：
1992
页码：
293-332
关键词：
摘要：
We develop an analytical framework to explain firm's choice of equity flotation method and the near disappearance of rights offers by U.S. exchange-listed firms. The choice between uninsured rights, rights with standby underwriting, and firm-commitment underwriting depends on information asymmetries, shareholder characteristics, and direct flotation costs. Underwriter certification and current-shareholder takeup are viewed as substitute mechanisms for minimizing wealth transfers between shareholders and outside investors. Uninsured rights create adverse-selection effects when shareholder takeup is low. Implications for stock-price behavior around issue announcements, shareholder subscription precommitments, and relative issue frequencies are supported by large-sample evidence.