REGULATION, COMPETITION, AND ABNORMAL RETURNS IN THE MARKET FOR FAILED THRIFTS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BALBIRER, SD; JUD, GD; LINDAHL, FW
署名单位：
Duke University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-405X
发表日期：
1992
页码：
107-131
关键词：
摘要：
This study investigates the returns to acquiring-firm stockholders in federally assisted mergers in the savings and loan industry. It is unique in that (a) these mergers are arranged and subsidized by government regulators and (b) they occur in a single industry, one plagued by well-publicized financial difficulties. The contribution of resources by the federal government creates the possibility of wealth transfers from the government to owners of the acquiring firms. We find, consistent with the oversubsidization hypothesis, that shareholders of acquiring firms earn significant positive returns.