THE HIDDEN COSTS OF STOCK-MARKET LIQUIDITY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BHIDE, A
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-405X
DOI：
10.1016/0304-405X(93)90039-E
发表日期：
1993
页码：
31-51
关键词：
摘要：
The seemingly unrelated problems of stock market liquidity and manager-stockholder contracting are closely intertwined. Active stockholders who reduce agency costs by providing internal monitoring also reduce stock liquidity by creating information asymmetry problems. Conversely, stock liquidity discourages internal monitoring by reducing the costs of 'exit' of unhappy stockholders. The U.S. has exceptionally many actively-traded firms with widely-diffused stockholding because public policy has favored stock market liquidity over active investing. And, the benefits of stock market liquidity must be weighed against the costs of impaired corporate governance.