SENIORITY AND MATURITY OF DEBT CONTRACTS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
DIAMOND, DW
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-405X
DOI：
10.1016/0304-405X(93)90011-Y
发表日期：
1993
页码：
341-368
关键词：
摘要：
This paper provides a model of how borrowers with private information about their credit prospects choose seniority and maturity of debt. Increased short-term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often. It also increases the sensitivity of financing costs to new information, although better-than-average borrowers desire information sensitivity. The model implies that short-term debt will be senior to long-term debt, and that long-term debt will allow the issue of additional future senior debt. The model also has implications on the structure of leveraged buyouts and on how various types of lenders respond to potential defaults.