TRADING VOLUME, MANAGEMENT SOLICITATION, AND SHAREHOLDER VOTING
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
YOUNG, PJ; MILLAR, JA; GLEZEN, GW
署名单位：
University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; Missouri State University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-405X
DOI：
10.1016/0304-405X(93)90024-6
发表日期：
1993
页码：
57-71
关键词：
摘要：
In an investigation of possible relationships between shareholder voting turnout, trading volume after the record date, and the intervals between the record and meeting dates, we find that higher trading volume and more trading days between the record date and the receipt of proxy materials both reduce voting turnout. A longer interval between the receipt of proxy materials and the meeting increases turnout, as does greater solicitation expense. Our tests show that management mails proxies further in advance of the meeting when its proposals require a majority of shares outstanding, as opposed to votes cast, for approval.
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