HOW MANAGERIAL WEALTH AFFECTS THE TENDER OFFER PROCESS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: COTTER, JF; ZENNER, M
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of Iowa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(94)90018-3
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 63-97
• 关键词: TENDER OFFERS; OWNERSHIP; COMPENSATION; golden parachutes; MANAGERIAL RESISTANCE

摘要

We present empirical evidence on the relation between changes in managerial wealth and tender offer characteristics. Changes in managerial wealth resulting from a tender offer are negatively related to the likelihood of managerial resistance to a tender offer and positively related to the likelihood of tender offer success. We also document that the abnormal returns to tender offers are lower for hostile than for friendly offers if we control for the tender offer premium. Finally, we find that the top executive gains, whereas outside shareholders do not gain, from management's decision to resist the tender offer.