APPOINTMENTS OF OUTSIDERS TO JAPANESE BOARDS DETERMINANTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: KAPLAN, SN; MINTON, BA
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(94)90025-6
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 225-258
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; Boards of directors; RELATIONSHIP INVESTING

摘要

This paper investigates the determinants of appointments of outsiders - directors previously employed by banks (bank directors) or by other nonfinancial firms (corporate directors) - to the boards of large nonfinancial Japanese corporations. Such appointments increase with poor stock performance; those of bank directors also increase with earnings losses. Turnover of incumbent top executives increases substantially in the year of both types of outside appointments. We perform a similar analysis for outside appointments in large U.S. firms and find different patterns. We conclude that banks and corporate shareholders play an important monitoring and disciplinary role in Japan.