OUTSIDE DIRECTORS AND THE ADOPTION OF POISON PILLS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: BRICKLEY, JA; COLES, JL; TERRY, RL
• 署名单位: Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of Rochester; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Oklahoma State University System; Oklahoma State University - Stillwater
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(94)90038-8
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 371-390
• 关键词: OUTSIDE DIRECTORS; Poison pills; Board of directors

摘要

We find that the average stock-market reaction to announcements of poison pills is positive when the board has a majority of outside directors and negative when it does not. The probability that a subsequent control contest is associated with an auction is also positively related to the fraction of outsiders on the board. These results are largely driven by directors who are retired executives from other companies. The evidence suggests that outside directors serve the interests of shareholders.