THE NATURE OF INFORMATION CONVEYED BY PURE CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHANGES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: SHAH, K
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(94)90031-0
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 89-126
• 关键词: capital structure; EXCHANGE OFFERS; INFORMATION; Financial distress; corporate control

摘要

This study investigates the information conveyed by intrafirm exchange offers. I find that leverage increases and leverage decreases convey qualitatively different information. Leverage-increasing offers appear to lower investors' assessment of risk of the firm's common stock, but do not appear to change their expectations of cash flows; leverage-decreasing offers appear to lower investors' expected cash flows, but do not appear to change their assessment of risk. The nature of changes in leverage, capital outlays, and dividends is also asymmetric. Further, I find that, for leverage-increasing offers, corporate control activity does not explain the information content or its asymmetry.