COERCIVE TENDER AND EXCHANGE OFFERS IN DISTRESSED HIGH-YIELD DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS - AN EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: CHATTERJEE, S; DHILLON, US; RAMIREZ, GG
• 署名单位: State University of New York (SUNY) System; Binghamton University, SUNY; Fordham University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(94)00815-I
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 333-360
• 关键词: DISTRESSED WORKOUTS; DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS; coercion; Financial distress; holdouts

摘要

This paper examines a recent sample of public workouts for distressed high-yield debt. The nature of holdouts and the effectiveness of coercive tactics in alleviating the holdout problem is analyzed. Tender offers are in relatively less financial distress, exhibit more severe holdouts, and are more coercive than exchange offers. Tender offers also have higher completion rates and fewer Chapter 11 filings. Security prices react positively to announcements of tender offers, negatively to exchange offers. Evidence suggests that coercion is not detrimental to bondholders, and may benefit security holders by increasing the likelihood of a less costly, out-of-court restructuring.