EVIDENCE ON THE STRATEGIC ALLOCATION OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: HANLEY, KW; WILHELM, WJ
• 署名单位: Boston College; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(94)00797-5
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 239-257
• 关键词: initial public offerings; SHARE ALLOCATION; institutional investors

摘要

The evidence reported in this paper suggests that institutional investors capture a large fraction of the short-run profits associated with IPOs. The favored status enjoyed by institutional investors in underpriced offerings appears, however, to carry a quid pro quo expectation that they will participate in less-attractive issues as well. This finding conforms with the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) prediction that U.S. underwriters behave strategically in the allocation of IPOs.