THE USE OF WARRANTS AS UNDERWRITER COMPENSATION IN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: DUNBAR, CG
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(94)00805-B
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 59-78
• 关键词: initial public offerings; Underpricing; underwriter compensation; SELF- SELECTION; WARRANTS; JEL CLASSIFICATION; G24; C34

摘要

Previous research suggests that offering costs are higher when warrants are used to compensate underwriters. This finding potentially arises from a failure to account for self-selection in estimating offering cost relations. Using methods that account for self-selection, I find that underpricing and total offering costs are reduced for firms using warrants as underwriter compensation, consistent with the hypothesis that issuers choose compensation contracts which minimize costs.