Board structure and fee-setting in the US mutual fund industry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tufano, P; Sevick, M
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(97)00033-0
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 321-355
• 关键词: mutual funds; Boards of directors; governance

摘要

This study uses a new database to describe the composition and compensation of boards of directors of U.S. open-end mutual funds. We use these data to examine the relation between board structure and the fees charged by a fund to its shareholders. We find that shareholder fees are lower when fund boards are smaller, have a greater fraction of independent directors, and are composed of directors who sit on a large fraction of the fund sponsor's other boards. We find some evidence that funds whose independent directors are paid relatively higher directors' fees approve higher shareholder fees.