The economics of parent-subsidiary mergers: an empirical analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Slovin, MB; Sushka, ME
• 署名单位: Louisiana State University System; Louisiana State University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00024-5
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 255-279
• 关键词: parent-subsidiary mergers; majority control; minority shareholders

摘要

We examine parent-subsidiary mergers, transactions that do not entail arm's length bargaining or a change in control. These mergers are typically followed by considerable restructuring of subsidiaries. Minority and parent returns are not significantly different from returns at third party buyouts of parent-controlled subsidiaries, transactions that entail arm's length negotiations and a change in control. Buyer returns an negative, consistent with overbidding. We conclude that parent-subsidiary mergers facilitate corporate restructuring, foster the reallocation of resources toward higher valued uses, and increase value for both parent and subsidiary. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.