Proxy contests and corporate change: implications for shareholder wealth

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mulherin, JH; Poulsen, AB
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(97)00046-9
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 279-313
• 关键词: Proxy contests; Market for corporate control; MANAGEMENT TURNOVER; Corporate restructuring

摘要

We study the shareholder wealth effects of 270 proxy contests for board seats in the 1979-1994 period. We find that proxy contests create value, with the bulk of the wealth gains stemming from firms that are acquired. Restricting analysis to firms listed on Compustat imparts a downward bias on estimated wealth effects because such a restriction excludes a sizable fraction of the firms acquired during the proxy contest. For firms that are not acquired, the occurrence of management turnover has a significant, positive effect on shareholder wealth because firms replacing management are more likely to restructure following the contest. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.