CEO incentive plans and corporate liquidation policy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mehran, H; Nogler, GE; Schwartz, KB
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Boston College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00040-3
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 319-349
• 关键词: Incentives; COMPENSATION; OWNERSHIP; DIRECTORS; Restructuring

摘要

To investigate CEOs' incentives to liquidate their firms, we examine the effects of insider ownership and compensation in stock options on 30 voluntary liquidation decisions by industrial firms in the period 1975-1986. We find that liquidation decisions are influenced by CEO incentive plans and increase shareholder value. Firms with more outside board members, smaller market-to-book ratios, and attempts by outsiders to gain control are more likely to be liquidated. Although few top executives of liquidating firms subsequently take comparable jobs, at least 41% of CEOs who downsize are made better off by liquidation. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G31; G32; G34; G35; J33; L22.