Information asymmetry, monitoring, and the placement structure of corporate debt

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krishnaswami, S; Spindt, PA; Subramaniam, V
• 署名单位: Tulane University; University of Louisiana System; University of New Orleans
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00059-2
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 407-434
• 关键词: debt financing; monitoring; moral hazard; adverse selection; capital structure

摘要

We empirically examine the impact of flotation costs, agency conflicts, regulation, and information asymmetries on a firm's mix between public and private debt. Results indicate that firms with larger issue sizes exploit the scale economies in flotation costs of public debt. Firms with higher contracting costs due to moral hazard have higher proportions of private debt. There is only limited support for the adverse selection hypothesis. We find little evidence that firms with favorable private information about future profitability choose more private debt. However, those firms with favorable information about future profitability that also operate under greater information asymmetry rely more on private debt. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.