The motivation and impact of pension fund activism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Del Guercio, D; Hawkins, J
• 署名单位: University of Oregon
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00011-2
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 293-340
• 关键词: SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; Pension funds; corporate governance; proxy contest; control activity

摘要

Pension funds have pursued an active role in corporate governance, although some question their effectiveness and motivations. We examine the impact and motivation of pension fund activism by studying the shareholder proposals of the largest, most active funds from 1987 through 1993. We find significant heterogeneity across funds in activism objectives, tactics, and impact on target firms, consistent with differing investment strategies. We find the funds are more successful at monitoring and promoting change in target firms than previously recognized. We also find no evidence to support motivations other than fund value maximization. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.