Bank entry, competition, and the market for corporate securities underwriting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gande, A; Puri, M; Saunders, A
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Vanderbilt University; New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00035-5
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 165-195
• 关键词: commercial banks; Underwriters; certification; spreads; yields; Glass-Steagall

摘要

This paper examines the competitive effects of commercial bank entry into the corporate debt underwriting market, particularly with respect to underwriter spreads, ex-ante yields, and market concentration. We find that underwriter spreads and ex-ante yields have declined significantly with bank entry, consistent with the market becoming more competitive. This effect is strongest among the lower-rated and smaller debt issues of which banks have underwritten a relatively greater share. The early evidence also indicates that bank entry has tended to decrease market concentration. Overall, our results suggest that bank entry has had a pro-competitive effect. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G21; G24; N22.