An analysis of compensation in the US venture capital partnership

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gompers, P; Lerner, J
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00042-7
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 3-44
• 关键词: venture capital; PRIVATE EQUITY; CONTRACT; limited partnership

摘要

Venture capital limited partnerships are an attractive arena to study cross-sectional and time-series variations in compensation schemes. We empirically examine 419 partnerships. The compensation of new and smaller funds displays considerably less sensitivity to performance and less variation than that of other funds. The fixed base component of compensation is higher for younger and smaller firms. We observe no relation between incentive compensation and performance. Our evidence is consistent with a learning model, in which the pay of new venture capitalists is less sensitive to performance because reputational concerns induce them to work hard. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.