What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brickley, JA; Linck, JS; Coles, JL
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00012-4
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 341-377
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; incentives; horizon problems; career concerns; board service; ceo compensation

摘要

This paper provides evidence on a previously unidentified source of managerial incentives: concerns about post-retirement board service. Both the likelihood that a retired CEO serves on his own board two years after departure, as well as the likelihood of serving as an outside director on other boards, are positively and strongly related to his performance while CEO. Retention on the CEO's own board depends primarily on stock returns, while service on outside boards is better explained by accounting returns. The evidence also suggests that firms consider ability in choosing board members. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.