Share issue privatizations as financial means to political and economic ends

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jones, SL; Megginson, WL; Nash, RC; Netter, JM
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; Wake Forest University; University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman; Indiana University System; Indiana University Indianapolis; IU Kelley School of Business
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00021-5
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 217-253
• 关键词: Privatization; IPO underpricing

摘要

This study examines how political and economic factors affect the offer price, share allocation, and other terms governments choose when they privatize state-owned enterprises via a public share offering. Using a 59 country sample of 630 share issue privatizations (SIPs) with total proceeds of over $446 billion during the period 1977-1997, we find that governments consistently underprice SIP offers, tilt their share allocation patterns to favour domestic investors, impose control restrictions on privatized firms, and typically use fixed-price offers rather than book building or competitive tender offers, all to further political and economic policy objectives. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.