The stock pools and the Securities Exchange Act

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mahoney, PG
• 署名单位: University of Virginia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00057-9
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 343-369
• 关键词: politics of finance; manipulation; Market regulation; NYSE

摘要

The stated justification for the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) was to eliminate manipulation. The primary evidence of manipulation was the existence of 'stock pools,' through which groups of traders jointly traded in a particular stock. The conclusion of Congress that the pools were manipulative is inconsistent with the evidence produced by the Senate's own investigation. The returns on a sample of pool stocks are also inconsistent with manipulation. These findings suggest that congressional and presidential desires to increase political control over the New York Stock Exchange was a more important motivation for the Exchange Act. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.