An analysis of contagion and competitive effects at commercial banks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Slovin, MB; Sushka, ME; Polonchek, JA
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Louisiana State University System; Louisiana State University; Oklahoma State University System; Oklahoma State University - Stillwater
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00036-7
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 197-225
• 关键词: contagion; Dividends; commercial bank regulation; contestability; Too big to fail

摘要

We examine whether an adverse event at one bank generates externalities for the banking industry, and assess whether the population of commercial banks is homogeneous. We find dividend reductions are negative events for both announcing money center and regional banks, but only reductions at money center banks have negative, contagion-type externalities. Dividend reductions at regional banks have positive competitive effects on geographic rivals. Regulatory enforcement actions induce negative valuation effects that are idiosyncratic to targeted banks, but actions against regional banks generate positive competitive effects on geographic rivals. Our evidence suggests that regional banking markets are not contestable. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G21; G28.