Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gillan, SL; Starks, LT
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00058-1
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 275-305
• 关键词: institutional activism; Shareholder voting; corporate governance

摘要

We study shareholder proposals across a period of substantial activity and find systematic differences both across sponsor identity and across time. To measure the success of shareholder activism, we examine voting outcomes and short-term market reactions conditioned on proposal type and sponsor identity. The voting analysis documents that sponsor identity, issue type, prior performance and time period are important influences on the voting outcome. Proposals sponsored by institutions or coordinated groups appear to act as substitutes gaining substantially more support than proposals sponsored by individuals. The nature of the stock market reaction, while typically small, varies according to the issue and the sponsor identity. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G34.