Pay for performance? Government regulation and the structure of compensation contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Perry, T; Zenner, M
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00083-6
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 453-488
• 关键词: ceo compensation; regulation; CONTRACTS; corporate governance

摘要

In 1992-1993, the SEC required enhanced disclosure on executive compensation and Congress enacted tax legislation limiting the deductibility of non-performance related compensation over one million dollars, i.e. Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m). We examine the effects of these regulatory changes and report small and large by the regulations. We further document that bonus and total compensation payouts are increasingly sensitive to stock returns after 1993, especially for firms with million-dollar pay packages. We also document that, once we control for other factors affecting CEO incentives, the sensitivity of the CEO's wealth to changes in shareholder wealth has increased from 1993 to 1996 for firms with CEOs near or above the million dollar compensation level. Overall, our results suggest that some firms have reduced salaries in response to 162(m). More importantly, the pay for performance sensitivity, measured using total annual compensation and firm-related CEO wealth, has increased for firms likely to be affected by 162(m). (C) 2001 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.