Firm performance and executive compensation in the savings and loan industry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hermalin, BE; Wallace, NE
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00058-7
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 139-170
• 关键词: pay-for-performance; Heterogeneity; savings & loans

摘要

This paper offers a new way to estimate the relation between pay and performance. In particular, unlike previous analyses, we account for the heterogeneity that theory tells us should exist across the compensation packages of different firms. Accounting for heterogeneity allows for more efficient estimates of the pay-for-performance relation and provides a means of testing the secondary hypotheses of agency theory. Among our findings are strong evidence of inter-firm heterogeneity in compensation, even within the same industry, the existence of trade-offs in using different performance measures, and insights about the factors that influence compensation packages. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.