Linking pay to performance - compensation proposals in the S&P 500

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Morgan, AG; Poulsen, AB
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; Clemson University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00084-8
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 489-523
• 关键词: Incentives; Executive compensation; Proxy voting

摘要

We study the proposal of manager-sponsored compensation plans linking pay to performance by S&P 500 firms in the 1990s. We examine the market perception of these proposals and the characteristics of the firms that propose them. Shareholders gain at the announcement of the plans, especially when the plans are directed toward the firm's top executives. Proposing firms are those that can most benefit from the plans, given their asset type and agency considerations. Firms with more potential agency costs have the highest vote-for percentages for the plans. However, shareholders are less approving of plans with negative features such as high dilution levels. Our work suggests that stock-based compensation plans are helpful in improving managerial efforts to increase shareholder wealth. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.