Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fenn, GW; Liang, N
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00039-3
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 45-72
• 关键词: dividends; SHARE REPURCHASES; Executive stock options; stock incentives

摘要

We examine how corporate payout policy is affected by managerial stock incentives using data on more than 1,100 nonfinancial firms during 1993-97. We find that management stock ownership is associated with higher payouts by firms with potentially the greatest agency problems - those with low management stock ownership and few investment opportunities or high free cash flow. We also find that management stock options are related to the composition of payouts. We find a strong negative relationship between dividends and management stock options, as predicted by Lambert ct al (1989), acid a positive relationship between repurchases and management stock options. Our results suggest that the growth in stock options may help to explain the rise in repurchases at the expense of dividends. (C) 2001 Published by Elsevier Science S.A.