Does Delaware law improve firm value?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Daines, R
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00086-1
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 525-558
• 关键词: LAW; corporate governance; Investor protection

摘要

I present evidence consistent with the theory that Delaware corporate law improves firm value and facilitates the sale of public firms. Using Tobin's Q as an estimate of firm value, I find that Delaware firms are worth significantly more than similar firms incorporated elsewhere. The result is robust to controls for firm size, diversification, profitability, investment opportunity, industry, managerial ownership, and unobservable firm heterogeneity. Delaware firms are also significantly more likely to receive takeover bids and be acquired. Results are robust to controls for endogeneity. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.