Stock option plans for non-executive employees

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Core, JE; Guay, WR
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00062-9
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 253-287
• 关键词: compensation and incentives; financing; employers; non-executives; Stock options

摘要

We examine determinants of non-executive employee stock option holdings, grants, and exercises for 756 firms during 1994-1997. We find that firms use greater stock option compensation when facing capital requirements and financing constraints. Our results are also consistent with firms using options to attract and retain certain types of employees as well as to create incentives to increase firm value. After controlling for economic determinants and stuck returns, option exercises are greater (less) when the firm's stock price hits 52-week highs (lows). which confirms in a broad sample the psychological bias documented by Heath et al. (Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1999) 601-628). (C) 2001 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.