Bankers on boards: monitoring, conflicts of interest, and lender liability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kroszner, RS; Strahan, PE
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00082-4
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 415-452
• 关键词: banking and commerce; Boards of directors; Conflicts of interest; lender liability

摘要

We investigate the trade-off between the benefits from bank monitoring when a banker is represented on a firm's board and the costs from two sources: conflicts Of interests between lenders and shareholders, and U.S. legal doctrines that generate lender liability for bankers on boards of firms in financial distress. Consistent with high costs of active involvement, bankers are on boards of large, stable firms with high proportions of collateralizable assets and low reliance on short-term financing. While permitting banks to own equity could mitigate conflicts, the protection of shareholder versus creditor rights could continue to reduce the role of U.S. banks in corporate governance. (C) 2001 Published by Elsevier Science S.A.