Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Volpin, PF
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00071-5
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 61-90
• 关键词: executive turnover; corporate governance; pyramidal groups

摘要

This paper studies the determinants of executive turnover and firm valuation as a function of ownership and control structure in Italy, a country that features low legal protection for investors, firms with controlling shareholders, and pyramidal groups. The results suggest that there is poor governance, as measured by a low sensitivity of turnover to performance and a low Q ratio, when (i) the controlling shareholders are also top executives, (ii) the control is fully in the hands of one shareholder and is not shared by a set of core shareholders, and (iii) the controlling shareholders own less than 50% of the firm's cash-flow rights. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.