Is the IPO pricing process efficient?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lowry, M; Schwert, GW
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Rochester; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00205-8
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 3-26
• 关键词: IPO; Underpricing; private information; learning; market efficiency

摘要

This paper investigates underwriters' treatment of public information throughout the IPO pricing process. Two key findings emerge. First, public information is not fully incorporated into the initial price range. While the economic magnitude of the bias is small, it is puzzling because it is not clear who benefits from it. Further, it indicates that the filing range midpoint is not an unbiased predictor of the offer price, as prior literature has assumed. Second, while public information is similarly not fully incorporated into the final offer price, the small economic significance of this relation indicates that the IPO pricing process is almost efficient. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.