The role of syndicate structure in bank underwriting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Narayanan, RP; Rangan, KP; Rangan, NK
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio University; University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00187-9
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 555-580
• 关键词: glass-steagall; Underwriting; Credible commitment

摘要

The re-entry of banking organizations into securities underwriting raises concerns over the possibility of banks using their lending-generated private information to benefit themselves and the issuing firm at the expense of investors. This paper illustrates the use of syndicate structure by lending banks to credibly commit against such opportunistic behavior and to exploit their proprietary information to lower issuance cost for borrowing firm issuers. We show that lending banks predominantly comanage with a high reputation nonlending underwriter. We present evidence that, relative to investment banks, comanaging issues allows lending banks to lower issuance costs for borrowing firms. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.