CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Grinstein, Y; Hribar, P
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.06.002
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 119-143
• 关键词: ceo compensation; Mergers and Acquisitions

摘要

We investigate CEO compensation for completing M&A deals. We find that CEOs who have more power to influence board decisions receive significantly larger bonuses. We also find a positive relation between bonus compensation and measures of effort, but not between bonus compensation and deal performance. CEOs with more power also tend to engage in larger deals relative to the size of their own firms, and the market responds more negatively to their acquisition announcements. Our evidence is consistent with the argument that managerial power is the primary driver of M&A bonuses. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.