US cross-listings and the private benefits of control: evidence from dual-class firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Doidge, C
• 署名单位: University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00208-3
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 519-553
• 关键词: INTERNATIONAL CROSS-LISTINGS; Private benefits of control; corporate governance

摘要

Non-U.S. firms that cross-list on U.S. exchanges have voting premiums that are 43% lower than non-U.S. firms that do not cross-list. The difference in voting premiums is statistically significant after controlling for firm and country characteristics and the difference is larger for firms from countries that provide poor protection to minority investors. When a U.S. listing is announced, both the high- and low-voting share classes benefit, although the low-voting class benefits relatively more. The evidence supports the bonding hypothesis: cross-listing in the U.S. improves the protection afforded to minority investors and decreases the private benefits of control. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.