Performance fee contract change and mutual fund risk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Golec, J; Starks, L
• 署名单位: University of Connecticut; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2002.05.001
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 93-118
• 关键词: performance fees; Mutual funds; RISK

摘要

We examine the effect that an exogenously, specifically governmentally required change in compensation contract had on a managerial decision. We find that a group of mutual funds changed their portfolio risk levels after they were forced to change their performance fee schedules. Their portfolio risk choices differed predictably from a randomly selected group of nonperformance fee funds and a group of performance fee funds that were not required to change their compensation contracts. In addition, the affected mutual funds lost both shareholders and assets around the time of the imposition of the restriction while the other funds exhibited little change or gained assets and shareholders. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.