Selling company shares to reluctant employees: France Telecom's experience

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Degeorge, F; Jenter, D; Moel, A; Tufano, P
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Universita della Svizzera Italiana
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00184-3
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 169-202
• 关键词: Privatization; Employee ownership; portfolio choice

摘要

In 1997, France Telecom went through a partial privatization. Using a database that tracks over 200,000 eligible participants, we analyze employees' decisions whether to participate; how much to invest; and what stock alternatives to select. The results are broadly consistent with a neoclassical model of investing behavior. We report four anomalous findings: (1) The firm specificity of human capital has a negligible effect on employees' investment decisions; (2) the amount invested seems driven by different forces than the decision to participate, and we attempt to measure an apparent threshold effect; (3) employees left on the table benefits worth one to two months' salary by failing to participate; and (4) most participants underweighted the most valuable asset. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.